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Abstract.  RIES stands for Rijnland In ternet Election System. It is an online voting system 
th a t was developed by one of the Dutch local authorities on water management. The system 
has been used twice in the fall of 2004 for in to ta l approxim ately two million potential voters.
In this paper we describe how this system works. Furtherm ore we do not only describe how 
the outcome of the elections can be verified bu t also how it has been verified by us. To 
conclude the paper we describe some possible points for improvement.
1 In trodu ction
RIES, the  R ijnland In ternet Election System, was developed by the  ‘Hoogheem raadschap van 
R ijn land’, one of the  D utch local authorities on w ater m anagem ent. In the  rest of th is paper 
we will refer to  th is  au thority  by ‘R ijn land’. The N etherlands is divided in approxim ately 35 
‘w aterschappen’. These are local authorities responsible for almost anything th a t has to  do w ith 
w ater in the ir region: the  quality of th e  w ater, th e  quantity  of the  water, the  quality of the  dikes 
and so on. In the  N etherlands th is is a serious m atter.
These authorities have th e ir own elections w ith typically between a half and one million po­
ten tia l voters. As a local au thority  these elections do not have to  follow the  D utch ‘kieswet’, the  
national law of how elections should be arranged in the  N etherlands. T hey are free to  use their 
own system  as long as th e ir board  has approved it. In order to  increase the  num ber of people 
actually  casting the ir vote and sim ultaneously to  decrease the  cost of such an election, R ijnland 
decided to  invest in setting  up an in ternet election system , even though in general it is absolutely 
not clear w hether th is can be done securely. See for instance [3] in which a very critical view to ­
wards in ternet voting is presented and the  advise is given not to  use th is technology a t all because 
of inherent vulnerabilities. R ijn land’s previous election in 1999 was an election by ordinary mail. 
The overall tu rn o u t was in the  order of 22%. U nfortunately  for R ijnland, the  tu rn o u t in 2004 was 
decreased to  17% of which 33% has voted by the  internet. This am ounts to  70.000 online votes, 
making it one of the  largest in ternet elections. There are no figures available yet on the  tu rn o u t for 
the  second tim e RIES was used: th e  elections for the  w ater m anagem ent au thority  ‘De D om m el.’ 
Since it is not relevant for th is  paper, we will not address w hether the  new system  was a success 
or not, from th is  perspective. We will only address technical m atters.
R ijnland sta rted  the ir development by asking a th ird  party  to  check the  security risks involved 
w ith setting  up an in ternet voting system . The D utch com pany TNO carried out th is p reparatory  
research and came to  the  following conclusions:
— M any risks involved in voting by in ternet are not higher th a n  in voting by ordinary mail.
— There are some risks typical to  in ternet settings like DDOS attacks and Trojan horses on 
client machines. However, there  exist procedural counter m easures for the  specific situation  of 
in ternet voting.
— None of the  currently  available system s can be applied to  R ijn land’s election.
See [6 ] for the  complete report.
Based upon th is TNO report, R ijnland decided to  develop and build its own system . It set 
up a project team  which included one of the  co-authors of the  TNO report, P ie t M aclaine Pont. 
Based upon th e  ideas from the  m aste r’s thesis ([4]) of one of his former students H erm an Robers, 
he designed the  RIES system . In order to  get some re tu rn  value for the ir investm ent R ijnland and 
M aclaine Pont have applied for p a ten ts  on the  system . In Section 2 we describe in detail bo th  
R obers’s system  and RIES. At th is  stage we only describe the  distinguishing feature of RIES: 
its transparency. Before the  elections take place all poten tia l outcom es are published. V ia clever 
bu t elem entary use of hashes and secret encryptions each voter can actually  check afterw ards 
if his vote has contributed  appropriately to  the  final outcome. See for instance [1] and [5] for 
cryptographically more advanced systems.
Several independent parties have looked a t the  RIES system  before it was actually  used during 
the  elections. This is where the  current authors enter the  picture, since they  were involved in this 
evaluation. During a public workshop before the  elections m ost of these parties presented their 
findings.
As independent outsiders the  authors have evaluated the  RIES system  before use, and have 
critically followed its deploym ent, including th ird  party  counting of the  electronic votes. This 
has led to  a national publication [2]. The current paper presents the  not widely known RIES 
system —together w ith our findings—to  an in ternational audience.
2 T he system s
Before we flood the  reader w ith m any details on the  two related  system s, we first want to  emphasize 
the  m ain idea. Essential in bo th  system s is th a t before th e  elections already a pre-election reference 
tab le  is published which contains all possible valid votes represented by key-less  hashes together 
w ith a m apping to  the  corresponding candidates. During the  election the  legitim ate voters build 
up a post-election tab le  w ith th e ir votes represented by hashes using th e ir  personal secret key. The 
outcom e of the  election is calculated by com puting key-less hashes of each vote in th e  post-election 
table. If th e  vote is valid, its hash value can be found in th e  pre-election tab le  and the  chosen 
candidate can be determ ined. And since th is  hash is a key-less hash anyone can com pute it, hence 
anyone can check the  result of th e  elections.
2.1 R o b e r s ’s sy s te m
T he system  described by Robers in his thesis [4] was developed for a local election a t the  Delft 
U niversity of Technology in th e  N etherlands. Key assum ption here was th a t  all partic ipants own 
a m ulti-function sm artcard . This sm artcard  is tru sted  and takes care of perform ing the  critical 
operations.
Robers describes th ree separate entities. In his thesis he uses a quite technical explanation of 
these entities. Here we opt for a more intuitive description.
Voter. A person who is allowed to  vote in the  election. He uses his sm artcard  to  authenticate  
himself to  the  election system  and to  perform  th e  necessary com putations.
A uthority. This is th e  party  in itiating  th e  election. It calculates a secret key for each voter and 
distributes th is key in advance onto each vo ter’s sm artcard . I t uses specific crypto-hardw are.
Anonymizer. This is a party  som ewhat inbetween the  voter and the  authority. Its  m ain function 
is to  publish relevant inform ation, especially the  pre- and post-election tables.
2 .1 .1  T h e  p ro ced u re  T he work is split into th ree parts: things th a t need to  be done before, 
during and after the  election.
Before the  election the  au thority  needs to  compose a list of valid voters. The to ta l num ber 
of voters m ust be published in order to  be sure th a t  no voters are added or deleted during the  
procedure. Furtherm ore the  au thority  chooses a unique identifier E l e c t io n _ID for the  election.
In addition for each of th e  candidates the  au thority  generates a unique id called C a n d id ate  J D .  
All of these ids need to  be published.
The au tho rity 1 generates a unique DES key K vot er for each voter and distributes it to  the  
vo ter’s sm artcard . On m ulti-function cards th is  loading can typically be done safely after issuing 
w ithout th e  need for secure channels. W ith  th is secret key and the  E l e c t i o n J D  the  au thority  
calculates the  so-called V o t e r J D :
V o t e r J D  :=  M DC(M AC k  (E l e c t io n J D ) )  (1)
Here MDC stands for M odification D etection Code, which is a public hash or one-way function . 2 
In o ther words the  M DC(x) is easy to  com pute once given x, bu t there  is no way to  derive the 
value x itself given M D C(x). MDC is used by Robers because th is function is a s tandard  function 
on the  IBM m ulti-function cards used. It can of course be replaced by any other reliable key­
less hash function. Furtherm ore, MAC stan d  for Message A uthentication Code. This is also a 
hash function, bu t based upon the  secret key K vot e r . In particu lar th is m eans th a t  wherever 
M ACKvot e r (x) appears, th is m ust have been calculated in a place where K vot er is known.
Using all these ids, the  au thority  now com putes a ballot collection for each voter. Each collection 
looks like this:
/  V o t e r J D  \
M DC(M ACK r (C an d idate  J D ^ )
M DC(M ACKvot e r (CANDIDATEJD2)) (2 )
y MDC(MAC_Kvoter (C a n d id ate  J D n  )) y
N ote th a t  K vot er only leaves the  crypto-hardw are on the  sm artcard  sent to  the  voters. The 
au thority  itself has no access to  K vot e r . The crypto-hardw are should delete these voter keys after 
distribution.
A fter sending these ballot collections to  the  anonymizer, encrypted w ith a special key K an o n , 
the  au thority  has finished all its tasks, even though the  election itself has not s ta rted  yet.
Now we discuss w hat th e  anonymizer has to  do. I t s ta r ts  by decrypting all the  ballot collections 
it received from the  authority. Next it sorts these collections upon the  V o t e r J D .  This guarantees 
th a t  there  is no link between the  order of the  collections and the  identity  of th e  voters. Finally, 
it publishes the  sorted list of ballot collections. We refer to  th is list as the  pre-election  table. It 
makes it possible to  link M DC(M ACKvot er ( C a n d id a te  J D ¿ )) to  candidate j .
D uring the  election the  anonymizer receives the  votes from the  voters. These are encrypted 
w ith the  anonym izer’s public key K hide public and hence the  anonymizer uses the  corresponding 
private key K hide secret  to  decrypt them . The anonymizer acknowledges th is  reception by writing 
some value in each vo ter’s sm artcard.
A fter the  election the  anonymizer publishes a list of all received ballots. We refer to  th is  list 
as the  post-election  table.
The th ird  party  involved is the  voter. During the  election he has to  use his sm artcard  to  
com pute his own V o t e r J D ,  based upon the  E l e c t io n J D ,  exactly as the  au thority  already did 
in (1). Since th is  requires K vot er only he can do this. Furtherm ore he identifies the  C and id a te  J D  
of the  candidate of his choice. T hen  he com putes his vote
M ACKvot er (C an d id a te  J D )  (3)
If he wants to  check his result he should also com pute th e  value
M DC(M ACKvoter (C an d id a te  J D ) )  (4)
1 Technically, this can also be done by a  different party  as long as it is a party  th a t uses crypto-hardware. 
Note th a t this must be done in an unpredictable way.
2 To be precise RIES uses the MDC 2 algorithm.
which he compares w ith the  values listed in the  published ballot collections a t the  anonymizer. He 
now knows w hether his vote will be in terpreted  correctly. He sends his vote to  th e  anonymizer:
/  V o t e r J D
\^MACKvot er (C an d id a te  J D )
The first p a rt of th is vote is used to  check the  authentic ity  of the  voter in an anonymous way. The 
second p a rt is used to  determ ine the  chosen candidate. To ensure th a t th is vote is not recorded 
during transm ission he encrypts his vote w ith th e  anonym izer’s public key K h ide public before 
sending it to  the  anonymizer. The complete setup of the  system  is shown in Figure 1.
Public readable before voting
MDC(MAC Kvoteri (Election_ID)) 
MDC(MAC KVoteri(Candidate_ID1)) 
MDC(MAC KVotei-i(Candidate_ID2))
Ballot collection:
( MDC(MAC k  t (Candidate_ID1))
MDC(MAC Kvotei^ (Candidate_ID1)) 
MDC(MACk  t r,(Candidate_ID2))
Public readable after voting
MAC k  vot eri  (Election_ID) 
MAC k  vot eri (Candidate_ID)
MAC K voteI2  (Election_ID) 
MAC K voter2 (Candidate_ID)
EKUdepubliJ MAC Kvoter (Election_ID) \ 
tade’pu b licl vr^C  Kvoter (Candidate_ID) j
VOTE PAIR:
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Fig. 1. This diagram  is an exact copy of [4, Figure 1.3].
A fter th e  election the  outcom e can be calculated by everyone w ithout using any secret keys. 
All one needs to  do is com pute M D C (V o t e r J D )  and M D C(M A CKvot er (C an d id a te  J D ) )  for all 
the  received votes published by the  anonymizer in the  post-election table. Note th a t  th is actually 
only requires th e  com putation of the  outer MDC hash values. These hashes can th en  be looked 
up in the  pre-election table. In th is  way one can determ ine for which candidate each vote should 
count. This transparency  and verifiability make the  whole approach very attractive.
2.2  R IE S
As m entioned earlier, Robers did his research under supervision of M aclaine Pont. And because 
the  system  was not pa ten ted  in 1998 bu t published as [4], it could be used as a sta rting  point for 
RIES. However there  are some m ajor differences:
— Because of the  cost aspect it was out of the  question to  give each poten tia l voter a m ulti­
function sm artcard . Therefore RIES uses a different system  for key m anagem ent and au then­
tication.
— R obers’s system  is a purely electronic voting system . RIES is not, since it also provides the  
possibility to  vote by regular mail.
— The stric t distinction between the  parties authority, anonymizer and voter indicated by Robers 
is not all th a t clear for RIES.
These th ree points will be discussed in more detail below.
2 .2 .1  S m artcard  rep la cem en t Because of the  high cost it was no option in the  w ater m an­
agem ent elections to  give each potential voter a personal sm artcard . Therefore R obers’s system  
had  to  be adapted. In his system  the  sm artcard  is used for two purposes: to  hold the  secret keys 
and to  perform  com putation  of th e  MDC and MAC.
D istribution  of the  secret key w ithin RIES is done by printing it on paper and sending th is 
paper by ordinary mail to  the  voter. The key is p rin ted  in sixteen digits of the  so-called AN34 
form at. This is a regular num ber system  ju s t like the  decimal or hexadecim al system , bu t now the 
base is 34. Its  digits are the  ciphers 0 , . . .  ,9 and the  characters a , . . .  ,k ,m ,n ,p ,.. .  ,z. The ‘l’ and ‘o’ 
are not used because the ir appearance is too  sim ilar to  ‘1’ and ‘0 ’. Using a high base like 34 means 
th a t  one can store higher values in fewer digits. And fewer digits prin ted  on th e  card means th a t 
it will be easier for the  voter to  enter the  digits on his com puter.
Obviously, since the  secret key is simply prin ted  on paper, th e  voter m ust be careful w ith the 
paper. No-one else should be able to  copy or memorize the  sixteen digits on his ballot. Hence after 
voting he should make sure th a t  the  key is destroyed.
The cryptographic com putations th a t  the  sm artcard  would have perform ed are now done by 
the  client’s com puter using JavaScript. If a voter wants to  vote, his browser connects to  a webserver 
and downloads a page th a t  contains JavaScript. W ith in  these scripts there  are routines available to  
com pute the  MDC and MAC values. Of course le tting  the  client’s com puter do these com putations 
implies a certain  risk: th e  JavaScript code can easily be modified in order to  send a rb itra ry  d a ta  
to  the  server try ing  to  im personate legitim ate voters. However, in order to  cast a valid vote, a 
client’s com puter should either be lucky enough to  guess bo th  a valid V o t e r J D  as well as a valid 
M ACKvot er ( C a n d id a te  J D )  or it m ust operate as a virus and read the  secret key from the  voter 
as he enters it. The first situation  is quite unlikely and the  second situation  can be detected if the 
voter checks his vote afterw ards .3
2 .2 .2  In teg ra tio n  w ith  m ail v o tin g  sy s te m  The m erging of the  electronic votes and the  
ordinary mail votes comes down to  a transform ation  of the  la tte r ones to  the  so-called technical 
votes already used by the  electronic votes. On each paper ballot there  are some special num bers 
from which the  V o t e r J D  and the  M ACKvot er ( C a n d id a te  J D )  can be com puted. The algorithm  
used for th is has not been m ade public, bu t obviously the  K vot er needs to  be in those num bers 
somehow. Hence after th is  transform ation the  mail votes are handled the  same way as in ternet 
votes.
Because the  mail voters are not getting  any feedback on th is transform ation  to  a technical 
vote, they  are not able to  check w hat has been done w ith the ir vote. Only in case they  cast bo th  
electronically as well as by mail they  can use the  electronic feedback to  see w hat happened w ith 
the ir paper vote. However, in the  previous election which was done entirely by ordinary mail, it 
was also not possible for the  voter to  check his vote, hence th is drawback does not make the  system  
any worse th a n  th e  previous one.
2 .2 .3  R o le s  w ith in  R IE S  W hereas Robers emphasizes a clear distinction between who does 
w hat, such com partm entalization is not so clear in the  RIES system . M ain party  in the  actual 
elections in the  fall of 2004 is a company called T T P I which consists of th e  architect of RIES, 
M aclaine Pont, and the  m ain developer A rnout H annink. For instance they  take care of creating 
the  secret keys, publishing the  reference tables, merging the  mail votes w ith the  in ternet votes and 
com puting the  final outcome. In particu lar th is  means th a t  th is T T P I company knows all the  ins 
and outs of the  system , including the  secret keys.
O ther parties involved in RIES are the  board  of R ijnland, SU R Fnet and of course the  potential 
voters.
3 There are also other alternatives to  protect against such viruses such as using candidate-identities th a t 
are different for each voter, so th a t the virus does not know which identity to  select. But this is not 
part of RIES.
2 .2 .4  T h e  d e ta ils  Because the  separation  in roles is not as clear as in the  original system  by 
Robers, we will describe th e  RIES details by looking a t the  different phases of the  procedure: 
before, during and after the  voting.
B efore the voting  M ost of the  work before the  actual voting takes place is done by T T P I. I t s ta rts  
by generating a DES key K i for each voter i. These keys are prin ted  on the  ballots. As m entioned 
before they  are represented on the  ballots in AN34 form at. Furtherm ore T T P I uses these keys 
to  generate the  same ballot collections we have seen in (2) in R obers’s system. By combining all 
these ballot collections the  so-called reference tab le  or pre-election tab le  is created. This tab le  is 
published on the  in ternet in the  form of a two level . z i p  file. See Figure 2 for an example. In 
principle it shouldn’t  m a tte r w hether these reference tables are presented as . z i p  files or ju s t as a 
huge . t x t  file. However, we have noticed a small problem  w ith the  use of . z i p  files in com bination 
w ith the  MD5 hashes, which are used to  prove th a t  files are not modified. We will get back to  this 
in Section 4.
Archive: 01010204. zi p Archive: R T_0.zip
Len g t h Date Time
N- a-m-e-
Le n g t h  Da t e  Time
N-a-m- e-
2172 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_0.zip 220 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:31 008AB1E98AEDFBA45 0 A 1 8 1 3 D D C 1 5 3 5 5 3
4017 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_1.zip 2 20 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:31 08677B73378E1D591 5 3 D E 3 0 2 6 3 A 3 C 4 7 C
2173 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_2.zip 220 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:31 06CAC042AF7D6940D D 8 A 5 1 8 1 4 E 6 8 D F F 8
1865 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_3.zip 220 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:31 00FEA51461FBF7B40 6 5 5 4 E E F 2 E 2 3 5 5 4 D
2789 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_4.zip 220 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:31 05C02BD8E3863DB24 D 6 C 3 3 2 A 1 7 B 7 8 E F B
3097 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_5.zip 220 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:32 070C60BFFC06B7355 4 2 5 E 6 F F A D B B E D 3 0
2787 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_6.zip 220 08 - 2 5 - 0 4  09:32 034C37BA687E21477 D 3 8 A 1 1 0 9 5 4 2 0 7 B 8
1559 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_7.zip
1559 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_8.zip 1540 7 files
2480 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_9.zip
2784 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_A.zip
3405 0 8-25-0 4 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_B.zip 0 0 8 A B 1 E 9 8 A E D F B A 4 5 0 A 1 8 1 3 D D C 1 5 3 5 5 3 :
2785 0 8-25-04 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_C.zip
1867 0 8-25-04 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_D.zip vervangend=0
1559 0 8-25-04 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_E.zip verstrekt=1
3403 0 8-25-04 09 32 0 1 0 1 0204/RT_F.zip vervallen=0
0 0 8-25-04 08 51 01010204/ AC949837430583 3 4 B 2 5 4 5 2 E 0 F 6 3 A 9 C 2 0 = 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 0 1
B0015BAC8E C F 7 6 6 D B 6 7 8 2 5 5 9 2 D C 1 0 9 5 7 = 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 0 2
40301 17 files ACE42133255CA8 1 8 4 D 1 8 E 0 2 9 3 F E F 7 E E 8 = 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 0 3
358AAB0C934757 A C C F 0 7 1 A 1 C D 7 3 2 E D E A = 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 9 9
Fig. 2. Reference table format. On the left we see the first level w ithin 01010204.zip. On the 
top right we see the second level: all hashed VoTER_IDs starting  w ith 0 are archived into 
RT_0.zip. On the bottom  right we see the ballot collection for the voter with M D C (V o te rJD )  =  
008A B 1E 98A E D F B A 450A 1813D D C 153553. It contains three lines with s ta tus bits indicating whether 
the ballot is a replacement, used or revoked. Because this particular election only had three real candidates 
(0101020401, 0101020402, 0101020403) and one blank (0101020499) there are only four entries found after 
the s ta tus bits.
A fter publication of these reference tables together w ith the ir MD5 hashes, T T P I no longer 
needs the  keys and destroys them . Checking th a t  th is actually  happens is a procedural m atter. 
See Figure 3.
D uring  the voting  During the  actual voting two parties are active. The vote server which is 
operated  by SU R Fnet, the  national in ternet service provider for universities in the  N etherlands, 
and of course the  voter.
Voter i copies the  codes p rin ted  on his ballot into the  appropriate fields of th e  web page 
in te rn e ts te m m e n .n l . In particu lar th is m eans th a t  he hands over his personal key K i to  the 
JavaScript engine of his browser. If he m anaged to  do th is  w ithout m istakes he can click on his 
favorite candidate j .  The JavaScript engine in his browser will com pute th e  so-called technical 
vote  which consists of two values: his V o t e r J D  which is equal to  M A CKi ( E l e c t i o n J D )  and 
M ACk . ( C a n d i d a t e J D j ). E xactly  the  two values we have already seen before in (5). This vote 
is sent to  the  vote server th rough SSL, and hence it is encrypted and cannot be revealed by o ther 
parties besides the  voter and the  vote server. Note in particu lar th a t  the  secret key K i is not sent 
over the  internet!
Fig. 3. Phase 1: before the voting
If the  server receives th is  encrypted vote, it decrypts it and strips all m eta  inform ation like 
tim e, date and network address from the  vote before storing it. I t com putes a receipt confirm ation 
and sends th is back to  th e  voter. After receiving th is confirm ation, the  voter should carefully 
destroy his ballot w ith his secret key. Furtherm ore he should store his technical vote (5) in order 
to  perform  a check afterwards. See Figure 4.
A fte r  the voting  After the  elections are closed, three parties come into action. F irst, SU RFnet 
hands over all collected technical votes to  T T P I. T T P I s ta rts  by com puting an MD5 hash over 
these files in order to  prove th a t  they  did not modify th e  votes from the  server.4 N ext, T T P I 
com putes the  to ta l outcom e and the  official voting office publishes it.
Before T T P I s ta rts  working on the  technical votes given to  them  by SU RFnet, they  transform  
the  scanned paper ballots into technical votes and add them  to  the  files received from SU RFnet. 
From th is point on they  are trea ted  as in ternet votes as well. Hence if we ta lk  about technical 
votes they  can originate either from an in ternet vote or from a mail vote.
T T P I com putes the  outcom e of the  election by com puting for each technical vote the  MDC 
hash on bo th  parts. In order for a vote to  be valid, the  com bination of these hashes needs to  
be somewhere in the  reference table. Votes th a t do not comply w ith th is rule are autom atically  
m arked as invalid. Furtherm ore, if the  hashes do represent a real vote, T T P I checks w hether the 
vote m ight be invalid because of some other reason. E.g. if one voter has cast votes for different 
candidates. If a vote is declared invalid, a log entry is created indicating why it was invalid and 
hence not counted. A later check can th en  show w hat happened w ith a particu lar vote. After 
filtering out all invalid votes, the  valid votes th a t  appear more th a n  once are also reduced to  one 
occurrence. Finally, the  actual counting is done by looking up the  hashes in the  reference table 
and appoint the  correct num ber of votes to  the  indicated candidates. See Figure 5.
4 We th ink th a t it would have been more trustw orthy if SURFnet com puted this hash before handing the 
files over to  TTPI.
Fig. 4. Phase 2: during the voting
3 R esu lts  verified
We have sta ted  in the  introduction  already th a t  one of the  distinguishing features of RIES is th a t 
it is transparen t. Each voter can check w hat has happened to  his personal vote and anyone who 
is interested can verify the  ta lly  process. In particu lar th is  m eans th a t  also people who were not 
allowed to  vote can check the  results.
3.1 V oter  sp ec ific  check
A voter can check his vote because he sees his technical vote on his screen during voting. If he 
saves th is  inform ation he will la ter be able to  search for his vote in the  post-election table. In 
th is  list next to  his technical vote also th e  MDC hashes of the  two p a rts  of th is vote are listed. 
W ith  those values he can check in the  reference tab le  th a t  his vote was indeed given to  his favorite 
candidate. In the  current im plem entation, there  is a drawback to  th is check system. It is completely 
based upon the  service provided by T T P I: they  have already com puted th e  hashes! So if a voter 
wants to  be really sure T T P I did not mess w ith his vote, he will have to  com pute th e  hashes 
himself. Fortunately  there  are program s available th a t  can do this. For instance recent versions 
of op en ss l  can com pute th is MDC hash. B u t the  voter can also im plem ent th is function in his 
favorite program m ing language. In the  JavaScript he already downloaded in order to  vote, he can 
find a JavaScript im plem entation of th is function which can be used as an example. Alternatively, 
th ird  parties m ight offer th is verification service.
Note th a t  the  fact th a t  th is  transparency  feature also introduces a potential privacy problem: 
anyone able to  find your stored technical vote will be able to  determ ine which candidate you voted 
for.
3.2  G en era l o u tc o m e  check
T he outsider ta lly  verification is also based upon th e  fact th a t  th e  com putation  of the  MDC hash 
can be done by anyone. The authors have w ritten  a Java program  th a t  uses the  files available for
'------------
SU RFnet
Fig. 5. Phase 3: After the voting
download a t the  website to  com pute the  final result. Though conceptually easy, we encountered 
some problem s while w riting th is  program .
F irst of all there is a problem  w ith the  files to  s ta rt w ith. Theoretically we should s ta rt w ith 
the  files handed over by SU RFnet. They are available for download, bu t the  problem  is th a t  these 
files do not include the  technical votes th a t  are transform ed from the  votes sent in by ordinary 
mail. Therefore we were forced to  s ta r t w ith the  file created by T T P I which already contains all 
the  sta tu s  b its on validity checks. Hence th is means th a t  our ta lly  still depends a b it on T T P I’s 
work, which is som ething we don’t  want. Fortunately, we can check th a t  th is T T P I file has a 
one-to-one correspondence to  th e  SU R Fnet file when it comes to  electronic votes. So at least we 
know for sure th a t  all in ternet votes have been counted correctly. Since there  is no way th a t  we 
can check the  validity of the  im ported  ordinary mail votes, we always have to  tru s t T T P I on this 
p art. Note th a t  if RIES would have been used in a purely electronic voting session, th is would not 
have been a problem  and the  system  could have been checked completely independent of T T P I.
The second problem  we encountered was in the  rules determ ining w hether a vote is valid or 
not. On im plem enting the  rules presented by the  RIES project team , we had to  make some choices 
on the  order of perform ing the  different validity tests. Obviously, for the  outcom e of the  ta lly  it is 
not im portan t to  know why a specific vote has been declared invalid. The only th ing  im portan t is 
th a t  the  same set of votes is declared illegal in the  different tally  program s. However, th e  choices 
we m ade incidentally happened to  declare votes invalid for exactly the  same reason as the  original 
ta lly  software from T T P I. And hence the  outcom e of our ta lly  was exactly the  same as T T P I’s 
outcom e, which was used as official outcom e of the  elections.
4 C ritical rem arks
B oth R obers’s system  and RIES present a practical way to  set up safe in ternet elections. Safe 
in the  sense th a t  it is possible to  detect fraud. As we have seen in Section 3 in ternet voters can 
check w hat happens to  the ir own vote. We would like to  stress th a t  it is im portan t th a t  voters 
indeed use th is possibility. U nfortunately, voters have complained th a t  in the  actual use of the 
RIES system  the  procedure to  check the ir vote is quite com plicated, hence reducing the  chance 
th a t  these checks will really be carried out.
Some critical rem arks are appropriate, however. They can contribute to  an even b e tte r  system.
— The current, mixed system  is not completely transparen t because of the  parallel election by 
ordinary mail. People who voted by mail do not really have the  opportun ity  to  check w hat 
happens to  the ir vote. In particu lar T T P I, the  party  th a t  merges mail votes w ith in ternet 
votes, should really be tru sted . In principle they  have th e  possibility to  tam per w ith the  mail 
votes. This can only be prevented by procedural checks.
— Since T T P I knows everything about the  system  it has a lot and m aybe too  much power. Not 
because we have reason to  believe th a t  they  abuse the ir powers, bu t m ainly because in general 
a separation of powers, com partm entalization, is wise, we would like to  see th a t  o ther parties 
take over some of the ir responsibilities.
— In Figure 2 we have seen th a t  the  ballot collection for each voter also contains th ree sta tu s  bits. 
These b its indicate w hether the  corresponding vote ballot is actually  being used or revoked and 
so on. W hen these reference tables are published before the  elections, th e  MD5 hash over the  
. z i p  files are com puted. However, if a voter complains th a t  he did not receive a ballot, he can 
ask for a replacem ent. This means th a t th e  sta tu s  b its for his first ballot will change from used 
to  revoked and the  sta tu s  b its for his second ballot will change from replacem ent to  used. For 
the  ta lly  process it is essential th a t  these changes are recorded. O therwise it would be possible 
to  cast valid votes w ith revoked ballots! Therefore the  reference tables need to  be modified 
after the  election. Obviously, since the  s ta tu s  b its are w ithin th e  files itself such a modification 
will cause the  MD5 hash of th e  complete . z i p  file to  change as well. The problem  here is th a t 
the  hashes are m eant to  detect w hether th e  MDC hashes inside the  files are modified or not. 
Hence by looking a t th e  hashes only it is not possible to  determ ine w hether a reference table 
. z i p  was modified only in its s ta tu s  bits or also in its content. In order to  verify w hether 
the  content has not been changed one really needs to  go into the  files and compare each 
ballot collection in the  modified tables to  th e  corresponding collection in the  original tables. 
The authors tried  to  au tom ate such a check for the  R ijnland election using a ‘d i f f ’ tool. In 
principle the  check worked, bu t we did not foresee th a t  the  order of the  MDC hashes in the  
files could have changed as well. Therefore our script reported  a lot of false positives: d i f f  
reported  perm utations of the  rows as modifications whereas these modifications are harmless 
w ith respect to  th e  RIES system. Adding a simple sort into the  script would solve th is  problem, 
bu t because of the  fact th a t  we were roughly talk ing about 2 0 0  million files to  check, we did 
not run  the  script again. We m anually inspected a random  set of them  and found th a t  they  
were all indeed false positives.
As a side effect our script showed th a t  the  to ta l num ber of s ta tu s  b it com binations in th e  . z i p  
files was exactly as published by T T P I.
— Using hashes in com bination w ith . z i p  files can also lead to  false positives for o ther reasons. 
For instance it should be possible to  build up the  modified reference tables by sta rting  w ith 
the  old ones, unzipping them  and applying th e  changes as recorded by the  voting office while 
handing out new ballots. After zipping the  new tables it would be nice if a check on the  MD5 
hashes showed th a t  th is construction indeed leads to  the  same tables published by T T P I. 
However, due to  different z i p  program s it is possible th a t files which are equal when unzipped 
will not be equal if zipped. Hence such a check is likely to  fail whereas it should not.
— The system  depends on collision free hashes. If two valid candidates or voters are m apped onto 
the  same hash value, it is no longer possible to  determ ine which candidate was the  chosen 
one. However, since these collisions can already be noted by the  au thority  after generating
the  reference tables, it seems th a t  th e  au thority  should be able to  replace the  keys for the  
particu lar voter causing the  collision. However, w ith a good hash function such collisions are 
extrem ely rare.
— Besides T T P I also SU R Fnet needs to  be tru sted . Since they  are able to  com pute th e  MDC 
hashes on each vote they  received, they  can detect for which candidate each vote is intended. 
And in particu lar th is  m eans th a t  they  can delete votes for candidates they  don’t  like. Since 
the  MD5 hash on the ir received votes will only be com puted when th e  election has been closed 
and th e  votes are handed over to  T T P I, it is difficult to  detect such fraud. An independent 
party  cannot detect it for instance. Only if each in ternet voter checks his own vote, he can 
detect th is  kind of fraud w ith his vote.
— Note th a t  it is not possible for SU R Fnet to  add valid votes: they  need the  secret keys for th a t. 
However, since T T P I is calculating th e  MD5 hash to  secure the  post-election table, and they  
had the  secret keys before the  election, they  are in a position to  alter or add votes in favor of 
specific candidates. Note th a t  they  can only do th is  if they  offended the  policy to  destroy the 
keys after d istribu ting  them! Fortunately  SU R Fnet can detect fraud like this. As long as they  
do not destroy the  files w ith the  received votes before T T P I publishes the ir list, SU R Fnet can 
detect any m odification w ith respect to  the  in ternet votes.
— The concept known as ‘family voting’ is always a risk in in ternet elections. However in this 
particu lar RIES setting, it is accepted as a risk, like it already was in the  previous election 
which was done entirely by ordinary mail.
— In general it is good to  have open source software for electronic voting systems. Because of the  
JavaScript used in the  RIES system , m ost of the  code is autom atically  open source. C urrently  
the  code running on the  server th a t  collects the  votes and the  ta lly  software is not open source. 
However, because of the  transparency  of the  system , th is is less im portan t. I t does not really 
m atte r w hat th is software does as long as th e  final outcom e is correct. And th is  is som ething 
th a t can be checked independently.
— DDOS rem ains a concern, bu t has not tu rn ed  out to  be a problem  in the  actual elections. 
SU R Fnet has taken  technical measures to  handle heavy traffic.
5 C onclusion
This paper has presented a critical account of the  actual use of a little  known in ternet voting 
system  RIES. The system  itself is very interesting because its verifiability: fraud can be detected. 
Independent recounts have indeed taken  place—leading to  the  same outcom e as the  official one. 
The procedural issues surrounding the  organization of the  elections based on RIES leave room for 
im provement. Especially the  merging of the  ordinary mail votes w ith th e  in ternet votes needs to  
become more verifiable. The designers have already announced the  intention to  im plem ent such a 
verification system . Hence the  RIES system  gives us a more positive feeling tow ards the  fu ture of 
in ternet voting th a n  the  authors of [3].
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